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Defendant-Appellant Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC ("Idaho Mutual"), by and through its
attorneys of record, Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, respectfully submits this Appellant's
Brief in support of its interlocutory appeal of the district court's April 22,2009 order granting
Plaintiff-Respondent Terra-West, Inc. ("Terra-West") leave to file an amended complaint.
I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case

In 2007, Terra-West recorded a hcially invalid mechanic's lien (the "First Lien") against
the subject property (the "Property"), and then filed its complaint (the "Oliginal Comnplaint") to
try to foreclose the invalid First Lien as against Idaho Mutual's interest in the Property. In the
Original Complaint, Terra-West alleged that it "performed all of its obligations under the terms
of the contract" for improveme~~ts
to the Property. R. p. 11 (emphasis added). On Idaho
Mutual's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court held the First Lien invalid and dismissed the
Original Complaint as to Idaho Mutual.
In the meantime, recognizing the likelihood that the First Lien would be held invalid,
Terra-West recorded a second mechanic's lien (the "Second Lien") for additional work it
allegedly performed on the Property after recording the First Lien. The very recording of the
Second Lien contradicts the allegation in Terra-West's Original Complaint that it had performed
all of the work contemplated by its contract by the time it recorded the First Lien.

In any event, instead of filing a timely new lawsuit to foreclose its Second Lien, and
moving to consolidate that lawsuit with this lawsuit, Terra-West moved for leave to amend its
Original Complaint to try to foreclose the Second Lien in this lawsuit, from which Idaho Mutual

already had been dismissed. Terra-West inexplicably delayed in filing its motion to amend,
failing to file it until five months and four days after the Second Lien was recorded. Of critical
importance to this appeal is that the motion was not granted, and Terra-West's First Amended
Colnplaint (the "Amended Complaint") was not filed, until well after the expiration of the
statutory six-month period in which Terra-West was permitted to commence proceedings to
foreclose its Second Lien.
By failing to file a colnplaint to foreclose the Second Lien within six months after
recording the Second Lien, Terra-West not only lost the right to foreclose the Second Lien, but
also deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enforce it. For that reason, the district court
erred in granting leave to amend to bring Idaho Mutual back into this lawsuit and to subject the
Property to a stale claim for foreclosure of the expired, and therefore invalid, Second Lien.
B.

Course Of Proceedings
1.

On December 6,2007, Terra-West recorded the First Lien in the amount of

$336,236 for alleged improvements made to the Property from August 23,2006 to November 30,
2007. R. pp. 14-15.

2.

On May 30,2008, Terra-West filed the Original Complaint for breach of contract

and to foreclose the First Lien. R. p. 6. Terra-West alleged that it had "performed all of its
obligations under the terms of the contract" concerning the improve~nentsto the Property.
R. p. 11 (emphasis added). The only cause of action asserted against Idaho Mutual was TerraWest's claimed right to foreclose the First Lien as against Idaho Mutual's interest in the
Property. R. p. 13.

3.

On July 16, 2008, Idaho Mutual filed a Rule 12@)(6)motion to dismiss the

Original Complaint as to Idaho Mutual. R. p. 28.
4.

On August 12,2008, before Idaho Mutual's motion to dismiss was decided,

Terra-West recorded the Second Lien for $395,372 (plus interest, attorneys' fees, and costs) for
additional improvements allegedly made to the Property. R. p. 91. The Second Lien was not a
part of or referenced in Terra-West's Original Complaint in any manner, as it did not even exist
when the Original Complaint was filed. R. pp. 6-27. The Second Lien incorporates the amounts
claimed in, and the work commencement date set forth in, the First Lien. R. pp. 91, 92; Tr. p. 5,
L. 19-25; Tr. p. 6, L. 1-3, 12-25; Tr. p. 7, L. 1-3, 18-25.
5.

On September 3, 2008, the district court granted Idaho Mutual's motion to

dismiss, declaring the First Lien invalid and dismissing Idaho Mutual from this action. R. pp.
31-36. Terra-West's breach of contract claim, which does not involve Idaho Mutual, was
unaffected.
6.

Several months later, on January 16,2009, Terra-West moved for leave to file the

Amended Complaint to assert a claim for foreclosure of the Second Lien. R. pp. 37-38,47.
7.

On February 12,2009, while Terra-West's motion for leave to amend was

pending, the six-month period following the recordation of the Second Lien expired. R. pp. 44,
68, 82.
8.

On March 5,2009, the hearing on Terra-West's Motion for Leave to Amend was

held before the district court. R, p. 80.
9.
R. pp. 80-86.

On April 22, 2009, the district court entered its Order Granting Leave to Amend.

10.

On April 23,2009, Terra-West filed its Amended Complaint, more than eight

months after the Second Lien was filed. R. pp. 87-110. The only claim asserted against Idaho
Mutual in the Amended Complaint was an alleged right to foreclose the First and Second Liens
as against Idaho Mutual's interest in the Property. R. p. 94.
11.

On May 6,2009, Idaho Mutual filed a motion in the district court for permission

to file an mterlocutory appeal of the district court's order granting Terra-West's motion to
amend. R. pp. 111-113.
12.

On May 20, 2009 the district court denied Idaho Mutual's motion to file an

interlocutory appeal. R. pp. 114-116.
13.

On May 26, 2009, Idaho Mutual filed Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC's Motion For

Acceptance Of Appeal By Permission with the Idaho Supreme Court.
14.

On July 1, 2009, this Court granted Idaho Mutual permission to appeal. R. p.

124-125.
15.
C.

On July 17,2009, Idaho Mutual filed its Notice of Appeal. R. p. 117.

Statement Of Facts
1.

On August 23,2006, Terra-West allegedly began making improvemeilts to the

Property. R. p. 9.
2.

On February 6, 2007, the owner of the Property, Milte Unvin Enterprises, Inc.,

recorded a Deed of Trust against the Property in favor of Idaho Mutual Trust. R. p. 32.
3.

On November 30,2007, Terra-West stopped making improvements to the

Property, having allegedly "perfonned all of its obligations under the terms of the contract" for
improvements to the Property. R. pp. 10, 11 (emphasis added).

4.

On December 6, 2007. Terra-West recorded the First Lien, in the amount of

$336,236, for alleged improvements made to the Property. R. p. 49-51.
5.

Sometime after December 7,2007, Terra-West allegedly made additional

improveinents to the Property, notwithstanding its assertion in the Original Complaint that it had
"performed all of its obligations under the terms of the coiltract." R. pp. 44, 11.
6.

On May 25, 2008, Terra-West allegedly stopped making the additional

improvements to the Property. R. p. 44.
7.

On August 12,2008, Terra-West recorded the Second Lien for $395,372 (plus

interest, attorneys' fees, and costs) against the Property. R. p. 91, 94. The Second Lien
incorporates the amounts claimed in, and the work commencement date alleged in, the First
Lien. R. p. 91, 92; Tr. p. 5, L. 19-25; Tr. p. 6, L. 1-3, 12-25; Tr. p. 7, L. 1-3, 18-25.
8.

On February 12, 2009, the six-month period following the recordation of the

Second Lien expired. R. pp. 44,68, 82.
9.

On April 23,2009, more than eight months after the Second Lien was recorded,

Terra-West filed its Amended Complaint to foreclose the Second Lien. R. p. 87-110.

11.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Idaho Trust asserts that the issues on appeal are:
A.

Did the district court err in holding that filing a motion for leave to amend a

complaint constitutes the commencement of proceedings to enforce a mechanic's lien within the
meaning of Idaho Code section 45-510.

B.

Did the district court err in holding that it had jurisdiction to enforce the Second

C.

Did the district court err in validating the First Lien by holding that Terra-West's

Lien?

Amended Complaint relates back to Terra-West's Original Complaint?
D.

Is Idaho Mutual entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho Code

section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 because the law is clear that a party cannot
conlmence foreclosure of a mechanic's lien more than six months after the mechanic's lien was
recorded?
111.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard Of Review

"[Tlhe decision to grant or refuse permission to amend a complaint is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court when a party proposes to amend its complaint after a responsive
pleading is served." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). This exercise
of discretion is "subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." Black
Canyon Racquetball Club v. IdahoFirst Nat'l Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900,

904 (1991). "The test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion is:
(I) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." Estate ofBeckev v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527,96 P.3d 623,628 (2004).

Generally speaking, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court disregards
"relevant factual considerations or principles of law and justice . . ." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho
759, 772, 727 P.2d 1187, 1200 (1986). A trial court disregards "principles of law and justice"
and acts inconsistently with applicable legal standards in allowiiig an amendment to a pleading
that does not state a valid claiin for relief. Black Canyon, 119 Idaho at 175, 804 P.2d at 904
(holding that "[ilf the amended pleading does not set out a valid claim . . . or if the opposing
party has ail available defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended complaint"); see also Estate of Becker, 140
Idaho at 527,96 P.3d at 628; Wells v. United States Life Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160, 167, 804 P.2d
333,340 (Ct. App. 1991). Parties have a right to be free from the costs in time and fees attendant
to defending legally invalid or factually groundless claims, see Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
1l(a)(l), 54(e)(l), including claims that have expired and claims the court lacks jurisdiction to
adjudicate. For that reason, it is error for a court to approve the filing of such claims.
The district court abused its discretion in granting Terra-West's motion to amend because
Terra-West's Second Lien had expired and become unenforceable under Idaho Code section 45510. Further, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the Second Lien. As demonstrated
below, granting leave to amend in those circumstances was contrary to Idaho Code section
45-510, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a), and Idaho case law.

B.

Filing A Motion For Leave To Amend Does Not Constitute Commencing
Proceedings To Enforce A Mechanic's Lien And, Therefore, Does Not Prevent A
Mechanic's Lien From Expiring Under Idaho Code Section 45-510
Terra-West did not commence proceedings as required by Idaho Code section 45-510

within six months after recording the Second Lien. The Second Lien therefore expired and

became unenforceable as a matter of law. As a result, Terra-West's Amended Complaint does
not state a claim for relief as to Idaho Mutual, and the district court abused its discretion in
granting Terra-West's motion to amend.
"[Nlo lien . . . binds any building, mining cIaiin, improvement or structure for a longer
period than six (6) months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a
proper court within that time to enforce such lien." Idaho Code section 45-510. The only way to
preserve a lien beyond six months after it is filed (i.e.,recorded in the real property records) is to
commence "proceedings" to enforce the lien. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure define, in
plain language, what constitutes the commencement of proceedings: "A civil action is
commenced by thefiling of a complaint with the court. . . . No claim, controversy or dispute,

may be submitted to any court in the state for determination or judgment without filing a
complaint or petition as provided in these rules; . . ." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a)
(emphasis added). Under Idaho Code section 45-510 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a), the
only way to preserve a mechanic's lien from expiring six months after it is recorded is byJiling a
complaint to foreclose it. Where a complaint has not been filed by that six-month deadline, a

mechanic's lien no longer "binds any . . . improvement or structure." Idaho Code section
45-510.
In Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65,995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho
Court of Appeals expressly held that the filing of a motion for leave to amend does not constitute
the filing of a complaint:
Service of a motion for leave to file [an amended complaint], even
with the proposed [amended complaint] attached, is not the
equivalent of service of the [amended complaint] itself. As Viafax

argues, receipt of the motion gave it notice only that it could object
to [an amended complaint] being filed and that the motion might
be granted. It remained possible that the court would deny the
motion, even without an objection from Viafax, or that
d
of the
Stuckenbrock would abandon the effort. Filing a ~ service
[amended complaint] itself could be properly accomplished only
afevpermission had been obtained fvom the court.
Viafax, 134 Idaho at 70,995 P.2d at 840 (emphasis added). Because a motion to amend, even

with the proposed amended pleading attached, does not constitute the filing of the amended
pleading, a motion for leave to amend cannot commence "proceedings" within the meaning of
Idaho Code section 45-5 10 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a).
This conclusion accords with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), under which TerraWest needed leave of court to amend its Original Complaint. Before an amended complaint is
deemed "filed," a party must request leave of court to amend, the court must then grant leave to
amend, and, finally, the amended complaint must actually be filed. As set forth in Viafax, an
amended pleading is not "filed" by merely requesting leave to amend, so a motion for leave to
amend is not enough to "commence" a proceeding.
The record is clear that Terra-West had not obtained leave of the district court to amend
its Original Complaint by the expiration of Idaho Code section 45-510's six-month deadline for
commencement of enforcement proceedings. The Amended Complaint therefore could not have
been filed within the six-month period. Because the Amended Complaint was not timely filed,
"proceedings" were not "commenced" within six months of when the Second Lien was recorded,
and the Second Lien expired on February 12,2009.

In granting leave to amend, the district court did not so much as reference these
authorities; instead, the district court simply held that "[tjhe C o w finds that Terra-West filed the

motion to amend its complaint within the statutory time required to bring ail action to foreclose
on a mechanics lien." This statement, while accurate on its face, does not justify granting leave
to amend, as under the Idaho law cited above, the mere filing of a motion to amend does not
satisfy the six-month deadline to commence proceedings to foreclose a lien. The district court
abused its discretion by rendering a decision that is contrary to applicable law.
C.

The District Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Enforce The Second Lien
Because the six-month period to enforce the Second Lien expired, the district court does

not even have jurisdiction to enforce the Second Lien. The district court failed to apply this most
relevant legal standard, and therefore abused its discretion, in granting leave to amend.
This Court strictly applies Idaho Code section 45-510's six-ruonth deadline. A lien
claimant's failure to bring an action within six months against a party whose interest the lien
claimant seeks to foreclose voids the mechanic's lien as to that party. In this regard, the sixmonth deadline has more bite than a mere statute of limitatioils (which the defendant can waive);
it is a limitation on the right itself. Willes v. Palmer, 78 Idaho 104, 108,298 P.2d 972,974
(1956). This Court has ruled that a Iieil claimant's failure to initiate an action within six inonths
strips a trial court ofjurisdiction to enforce the lien altogether:
The statute creates and limits the duration of the lien. The statute
also gives jurisdiction to the court toforeclose or enforce a lien on
certain conditions -the filing of a claim of lien, and the
commencement of the action within the time specified after such
claim is filed. If these things are not done nojurisdiction exists in
the court to enforce the lien. When the limit fixed by statute for
duration of the lien is past, no lien exists, any more than if it had
never been created.

Palmer v. Bradford, 86 Idaho 395, 401, 388 P.2d 96,99 (1963) (internal citations omitted,
emphasis added); see also Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 497,
501, 185 P. 554,555 (1919) (lien void as against mortgagee when suit not timely filed) (applying
Idaho law); D. W: Standrod & Co. v. Utah Implement-Vehicle Co., 223 F. 5 17, 518-519 (9th Cir.
1915) (lien is void as against all subsequent encumbrancers who were not made parties to an
action to foreclose the lien within six months from the date of the filing thereof) (applying Idaho
law); Cont '1 & Commercial Trust v. Pac. Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781,788 (9th Cir. 1915)
(holding that the predecessor to Idaho Code section 45-510 requires that a timely foreclosure
action must be brought against all of those whose rights, estates, or interests are claimed to be
adverse and subordinate; otherwise they could not be added); Utah Implement-Vehicle Co. v.
Bowman, 209 F. 942,947-48 (D. Idaho 1913) (where mortgagee of property was not made a
party to suit to enforce mechanic's lien within statutory period the lien was of no effect against
mortgagee's interest). In granting leave to amend, the district court disregarded these clear,
long-standing court decisions.
In Diehl Lumber Transportation, Inc. v. Miclcleson, 802 P.2d 739 (Utah App. 1990), the
Utah Court of Appeals addressed the very question presented here, holding that the lien
claimant's motion for leave to file a complaint did not save the lien from statutory expiration.
DiehlLuinber involved a mechanic's lien claimani that, based on the recording date of its lien
and the Utah Code, had until July 9, 1987 to file a lien foreclosure action. Id. at 741-42. On
June 12, 1987, the lien claimant filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint. Id. at
742. The trial court granted the lien claimant leave to file the amended pleading, but not until
November 25, 1987, after the statutory time to foreclose the lien had expired. Id. The Utah

Court of Appeals held that the lien was time-barred because the hial court did not grant the lien
claimant's motion for leave to file the third-party complaint until after the lien had expired. As a
result, "the third-party conlplaint was not filed within the statutory time," and the trial court
"lacked jurisdiction to rule on the foreclosure claim." Id. at 743.
Terra-West could have timely filed a separate action to foreclose the Second Lien. It also
could have nloved to consolidate that separate action with this one. That approach would have
avoided the expiration of the Second Lien while Terra-West's motion to amend was pending.
Instead, Terra-West chose to follow the needlessly risky path of the Diehl Lumber lien claimant.
The result here should be the same as it was there. Because Terra-West did not commence
proceedings to enforce the Second Lien within six months of recording it, the district court lacks
jurisdiction to enforce the Second Lien.
It is important to recognize that the filing of Terra-West's motion to amend did not
actually commence an action against Idaho Mutual. Filing that motion merely was a request for
the district court'spermission to commence an action - a request that Terra-West could have

either (1) made sooner, so that permission could have been granted and the Amended Complaint
filed prior to the expiration of the six-month deadline, or (2) not made at all, and instead simply
initiated a new action by filing a new complaint to foreclose the Second Lien. Terra-West
improvidently allowed its Second Lien to expire. Idaho Mutual is not to blame for Terra-West's
mistake. By virtue of that mistake, Terra-West has not sacrificed its right to recover for the work
done under its breach of contract claims, but it has lost the right to recover from the Property.

D.

By Permitting The Amended Complaint To Relate Back To The Original
Complaint, The District Court Validated The First Lien, Controverted Its Earlier
Order Of Dismissal, And Created A New, Non-Statutory Lien Right
If this Court finds that the Second Lien expired under Idaho Code section 45-510, than

the question of whether the Amended Complaint "relates back to" the date of the Original
Complaint is moot. If this Court finds that the Second Lien has not expired under Idaho Code
section 45-510, then the district court's ruling that the Amended Complaint relates back to the
Original Complaint is at issue.
Because the Original Complaint did not give notice of the Second Lien or that additional
work might be performed pursuant to Terra-West's contract for improvements to the Property,
the Amended Complaiilt cannot relate back to the Original Complaint under clear principles of
Idaho law. The district court misapplied the principle of "relation back" under Idaho law and
abused its discretion by holding that the Amended Complaint "relates back to" the date of the
Original Complaint.
This Court has held that if an amended pleading sets forth a new cause of action that is
not related to the original transaction or occurrence, the amendment does not date back to the
date of the original pleading. Idaho First Nut '1 Banlc v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,
281, 824 P.2d 841,856 (1991). In Idaho First, the court held that an amendment adding a
defamation cause of action to a counterclaim did not relate back because the original
counterclaim did not allege any such cause of action and did not allege any conduct that would
give rise to a defanation action. Id., at 281-82, 824 P.2d at 856-57. Because the original
pleading provided no notice of a defamation claim, the claim could not relate back. Id. at 282,
824 P.2d at 857. See also Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952,842 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. l992),

abrogated on other gvounds by Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 161, 158 P.3d 937,942 (2007)
(holding that a fraud claim did not relate back where the original counterclaim did not give
notice of such a claim, the conduct alleged in the original counterclaim did not rise to the level of
fraud, and the conduct related to the fraud claim occurred at a different time).

In determining whether a new claim relates back to the filing of an original pleading, the
analysis must center on whether the original pleading gave notice of the new claims; where the
original pleading gave no notice of the new claims, the new claims cannot relate back. Wing v.
Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 270, 688 P.2d 1172, 1175 (1984), highlights the "notice" analysis central
to the relation-back doctrine. In Wing, the proposed new cause of action involved a different set
of alleged facts, including conduct that occurred at a different time than the conduct alleged in
the original complaint. Id. Because the original complaint did not give notice of either the new
alleged facts or of the legal theory advanced in the proposed amendment, the new cause of action
could not relate back to the original complaint. Id. With no relation back, the new cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations. Id.; see also Black v. Amevitel Inns, Inc., 139
Idaho 51 1,514,81 P.3d 416,419 (2003) (holding that the amended complaint could not relate
back to cure a defective complaint that was signed in violation of Rule 11); Black Canyon, 119
Idaho at 178, 804 P.2d at 907 (holding that ail amendment did not relate back where the new
causes of action were entirely different from the claims contained in the original complaint).
Terra-West's Original Complaint did not give notice of the additional work that the
Second Lien purports to secure payment for - in fact, Terra-West's Original Complaint states
affirmatively that Terra-West "performed all of its obligations under the terms of the contract"
for improvements to the Property. R. p. 11 (emphasis added). The Second Lien did not even

exist at the time the Original Complaint was filed. Terra-West's Original Complaint does not
indicate that Terra-West was awaiting government approvals before doing additional work, or
that additional work was intended by any party or conteinplated by the contract. The Original
Complaint affirmatively notifies all defendants that Terra-West would perform no further work
on the Property.
Notwithstanding Terra-West's representations in the Original Complaint that it had
completed all of the work contemplated by the contract for improvements to the Property, TerraWest alleges that the Second Lien arises under the same contract as did the First Lien. Because
the Original Complaint gives notice that no subsequent work would be performed, however,
Terra-West's contradictorypost hoc allegations are immaterial to the relation-back analysis. The
Second Lien is an entirely new right, an entirely new claim in the Property that was not
suggested by the Original Complaint. Indeed, the Second Lien must be a new claim because the
original claim was declared invalid; because the Original Complaint gives no notice of this
entirely new claim, however, the Second Lien cannot relate back.
In dismissing the Original Complaint as against Idaho Mutual, the district court found
Terra-West's First Lien invalid. That ruling did not negate any right Terra-West has to recover
for the debt under a breach-of-contract claim. Terra-West remained free to pursue collection
against Milce Urwin Enterprises, Inc. The district court merely held that because the First Lien
did not comply with Idaho law, Terra-West could not recover from the Property. In granting
leave to amend, however, the district court in effect allowed Terra-West to resurrect its invalid
First Lien, in contravention of its order of dismissal. The Second Lien entirely incorporates the
First Lien, inasmuch as the Second Lien purports to relate back to the work-started date set forth

in the First Lien, and inasmuch as the Second Lien alleges a right to recover for all amounts
claimed in the First Lie11.l While the district court's order granting leave to amend ostensibly
reaffirms the invalidity of the First Lien (R., pp. 84-85), the practical effect of the district court's
ruling, ironically, is to offer Terra-West another opportunity to enforce the claims set forth in the
First Lien. By so ruling, the district court created a non-statutory means for validating a
statutorily invalid lien.

E.

Idaho Mutual Is Entitled To Attorneys' Fees On Appeal
Idaho Mutual requests attorneys' fees on appeal because Terra-West's Second Lien

expired and became unenforceable under well-established Idaho law before Terra-West
commenced proceedings to enforce it. The appellant is entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal
under Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a) and Idaho Code section 12-121 when this Court is "left with an
abiding belief that the appeal has been . . . defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation." Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,74,785 P.2d 634,638 (1990). Terra-West
carnot point to any statute, rule of court, or appellate decision to support its claim that it timely
"commenced proceedings" to foreclose its Second Lien. As a result, Terra-West had no
foundation on which to defend this appeal and an award of attorney fees in favor of Idaho
Mutual is appropriate.
That the Second Lien incorporates the First Lien is made clear by counsel's arguments
Tr. p. 5, L. 19-25; Tr. p. 6, L. 1-3, 12-25; Tr. p. 7, L. 1-3, 18-25. Also, it is instructive that
Terra-West: (1) alleged in its Amended Complaint that the work which gave rise to the
Second Lien was "the remaining work under its original agreement" regarding improvements
to the Property (R. p. 91); (2) Terra-West alleges that the Second Lien is prior to all other
interests in the Property (R. pp. 92, 94); and (3) Terra-West attached only its First Lien to its
Amended Complaint, not the Second Lien, indicating that the Amended Complaint is
primarily an attempt to foreclose the First Lien (R. p. 97).

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Idaho Mutual respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the district court's order granting Terra-West's motioil for leave to amend its Original
Complaint.
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